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[Health and safety at work remains a serious and under-recognised prob-
lem in Australia. This paper argues for the importance of increasing the 
individual responsibility and accountability of senior managers and direc-
tors of corporations for the development and maintenance of occupational 
health and safety (OHS) standards in the workplace. In order to do so, the 
paper first sets out the range of statutory and general law duties and li-
abilities to which directors and senior managers are subject, considers to 
what extent these obligations have relevance in the OHS area and argues 
for the extension of these duties and liabilities in some circumstances. The 
paper then goes on to argue for a better legislative model for the legal re-
sponsibility of managers and officers, supported by the increased prosecu-
tion of individuals in appropriate circumstances, as well as acknowledging 
the benefits of a broader range of non-legal strategies to improve board-
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I THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM OF WORKPLACE 
INJURIES AND FATALITIES 
The role and effectiveness of the law in promoting workplace health and safety 
warrants continued scrutiny because workplace deaths and injuries remain a serious 
social and economic problem in Australia. In its report in October 2003, the Pro-
ductivity Commission estimated that work-related deaths, injuries and illnesses cost 
individuals, the community and the economy in excess of $30 billion annually. In 
addition, said the Commission, ‘injured workers and their families face the accom-
panying pain and suffering’.1 With respect to injuries, the Industry Commission in 
1995 estimated that at any one time, more than 200,000 people could not work at all 
due to an injury or disease sustained at work, and a further 260,000 had been forced 
to change jobs or reduce working hours due to work-related injury.2
 
Deaths and injuries at work are largely avoidable. Research indicates that, far from 
being mostly ‘acts of God’ or the result of worker carelessness, their causes are 
more often attributable to ‘management failures, systems breakdowns, and the 
neglect by organisations, their senior officers and workers to take health and safety 
as seriously as they should’.3
 
To address the problem, all states and territories, and the Commonwealth, have 
specific purpose OHS statutes that place a general duty on employers to ensure that 
the workplace is safe and without risks to health.4 Occupational health and safety 
statutes in Australia are broadly similar in approach, due at least in part to the 
profound influence of the 1972 Robens report on the design of British and (in the 
1980s) Australian OHS legislation, which is still being felt today.5 All of the stat-
utes encourage organisations to identify OHS problems specific to their workplaces, 
and design and implement systems and strategies to reduce or eliminate risk. They 
impose duties on a range of persons whose actions may affect the safety of the 
workplace, including employers, employees, manufacturers and importers of plant 
and equipment and suppliers of chemicals.  
The author acknowledges with thanks the helpful comments on a draft of this paper by Colin Fenwick, 
Director, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, the University of Melbourne, and Dr Fiona 
Haines, Department of Criminology, the University of Melbourne, as well as the helpful comments of 
the anonymous referee.   
1 INDUSTRY COMMISSION, NATIONAL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND 
SAFETY FRAMEWORKS INTERIM REPORT 20 (2003).  
2 INDUSTRY COMMISSION, WORK, HEALTH AND SAFETY  xviii (1995). 
3 ANDY HALL, RICHARD JOHNSTONE, ALEXA RIDGEWAY, REFLECTION ON REFORMS: DEVELOPING 
CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INDUSTRIAL DEATHS, WORKING PAPER 26, NATIONAL RESEARCH 
CENTRE FOR OHS REGULATION 11 (2004).  
4 See Occupational Health and Safety Act, 2004 (Vic); Occupational Health and Safety Act, 2000 
(NSW); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 1984 (WA); Workplace Health and Safety Act, 1995 (Qld); 
Workplace Health and Safety Act, 1995 (Tas); Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act, 1986 (SA); 
Work Health Act, 1986 (NT), Occupational Health and Safety (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1991. 
The Commonwealth has no direct constitutional power over occupational health and safety matters, 
except with respect to its own employees, but plays an advisory and co-ordinating role through the 
National Occupational Health and Safety Commission. 
5 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SAFETY AND HEALTH AT WORK 1970-72 (ROBENS REPORT) (1972). 
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In all jurisdictions, the legislation provides for the monitoring and investigation by 
specific-purpose government agencies of workplace adherence to OHS laws. These 
agencies place a strong emphasis on the provision of information and guidance to 
assist employers to meet their statutory obligations. This guidance may be informal, 
or may take the form of codes of practice that address specific hazards and issues 
and that may have evidentiary weight in prosecutions. The statutes also provide for 
non-prosecutorial mechanisms to promote compliance (such as the issue of written 
notices requiring a safety breach to be remedied), as well as for prosecutions for the 
failure to meet statutory health and safety obligations. Breaches of the legislation 
may be summary or indictable offences depending on the act in question, but it is 
common for all but the most serious indictable offences to be tried summarily.  
 
As well as OHS legislation, there are other ways in which the law could be said to 
promote good OHS practices. The employer’s common law duty of care to provide 
a safe workplace is still argued to have an important deterrent effect, as well as 
meeting its primary aim of providing damages to workers who have been injured as 
a result of a breach of that duty.6 The workers’ compensation schemes may also 
have some deterrent effect on unsafe work practices, as insurance premiums are 
often related to the cost of previous claims and the level of risk of the industry in 
which the employer operates.  
 
II DIRECTORS’ AND MANAGERS’ LIABILITY FOR OHS FAILURES 
UNDER THE GENERAL LAW  
The OHS statutes are the principal source of directors’ and managers’ individual 
liability for OHS failures. In most cases individual liability is dependent upon proof 
of employer (organisational) liability. Directors of corporations and persons con-
cerned in the management of corporations may be prosecuted. Before considering 
these statutory liabilities in more detail, it is useful to consider the degree to which 
officers and senior managers may be accountable for safety breaches under the civil 
and the general criminal law.  
 
A Civil  liability  
The law has long-recognised that employers have a duty of care at common law for 
the health and safety of their workers.7 Where the employer is a company, it is the 
company itself, rather than the individuals who own and operate it, that owes the 
duty of care. The duty is not owed by individual directors or employees, and this 
6 See eg Workers Online, Issue no 102, July 2001, available at <www.labour.net.au> (last visited 31 
March 2005). It is important to note, however, that right of an employee to sue his or her employer in 
negligence has been abolished or seriously curtailed in most Australian jurisdictions, in favour of 
statutory workers’ compensation claims. 
7 Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co v English, [1938] AC 57 (Eng. H. of L 1938).  
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principle holds even in the case of a company that is a one-person company.8 This 
follows directly from the separate legal entity principle articulated in Salomon v 
Salomon & Co.9 The principle was reiterated by the High Court in the recent case of 
Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd, where the court stated that “[T]he com-
mon law duty to take reasonable care for the safety of employees is imposed di-
rectly on Andar by virtue of its status as an employer. The duty is not imposed upon 
individual directors of a corporate employer.’10
 
There have been a small number of negligence cases where the courts have held 
that a director is personally liable for torts committed in the course of the com-
pany’s business. A director may be liable, for example, if he or she procures or 
directs the commission of a tort, or if he or she assumes personal responsibility for 
the performance of a duty. 11 In the area of workplace deaths, it may be possible for 
a director to act towards an employee of the company in such a way that they can 
be said to have legally assumed personal responsibility towards the employee so as 
to create a special relationship, although there appear to be no cases where the issue 
has been raised explicitly in the workplace safety context.12  
 
Commentators on the case law argue that no coherent set of principles has devel-
oped for attributing personal liability to directors for negligently-caused losses.13 In 
the light of this, and given the settled tort law principles about the employer’s duty 
of care, it would appear highly unlikely that the law of tort would develop so as to 
place general liability on directors in the workplace safety area.  
B  Directors’ duties 
The duties owed by directors in equity and under corporations legislation are not 
owed to third parties like employees. Directors’ duties are owed to the company and 
are concerned with protecting the financial interests of its shareholders and, in 
certain narrowly defined circumstances where the company is at risk of insolvency, 
its creditors.14  
 
However, ensuring a company provides a safe working environment for its employ-
ees is arguably encompassed by a director’s duty to act honestly in the best interests 
of the company, either in equity or under s 181(1)(a) of the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth). This is because poor OHS systems are not in the company’s best interests – 
8 Always assuming that the company is not a sham: Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd, [1961] AC 12, 26 
(Eng. H. of L. 1961, per Lord Morris). 
9 [1897] AC 22 (Eng. H. of L, 1897). 
10 [2004] HCA 28, para [49] (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
11 See eg Wah Tat Bank Ltd v Chan, [1975] AC 507 (Eng. H. of L 1975); Trevor Ivory Ltd v Anderson, 
[1992] 2 NZLR 517. 
12 CENTRE FOR CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, RESPONSE TO HOME OFFICE CONSULTATION DOCUMENT 
‘REFORMING THE LAW ON INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER THE GOVERNMENTS PROPOSALS’ 3.27 
(2000).  
13 Helen Anderson, The Theory of the Corporation and Its Relevance to Directors’ Tortious Liability to 
Creditors, 16 AUST J CORP L 73 (2004). 
14 Spies v R, (2000) 201 CLR  603 (High Court of Australia, 2000). 
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they demonstrably affect a company adversely through lost time, higher workers’ 
compensation premiums, the possibility of penalties under OHS legislation, and the 
adverse publicity that may follow a serious workplace accident. Nevertheless, there 
are no judicial statements that even hint that such an interpretation of this fiduciary 
obligation might develop in the courts. We could posit several reasons for this. As 
OHS obligations are addressed expressly by statute, and have been so for over  a 
hundred years, judges may see no need to duplicate them by way of an expanded 
and novel interpretation of the duty to act in the ‘interests of the company’. More 
importantly, such a novel expansion would run counter to the central concern of the 
courts in developing and interpreting directors’ duties over a long period of time, 
which is to protect proprietary rights. As the Senate Standing Committee observed 
in its 1989 report Company Directors’ Duties (the Cooney report), ‘[c]ompany case 
law provides a slender basis for extending directors’ duties to anyone other than the 
company and those who have proprietary interests in it: the shareholders and, in 
certain circumstances, creditors’.15  
 
The obvious means by which directors’ duties can be extended is by way of express 
provisions in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), or by way of positive duties in OHS 
legislation. In 1989, a Senate Standing Committee was asked to consider whether 
such an extension was warranted as part of its general review of directors’ duties. 
The Committee recommended that the ‘companies legislation be amended to make 
it clear that the interests of a company’s employees be taken into account by direc-
tors in administering the company’.16 The Committee believed that the narrow 
approach company law has traditionally taken was difficult to reconcile with con-
temporary reality. This is still true today and is evidenced by, amongst other things, 
the continuing interest by many in promoting corporate social responsibility to-
wards stakeholders affected by the company’s operations, and towards the commu-
nity generally and the environment. The Committee’s recommendation was never 
acted upon. The issue is being revisited, however, with the Parliamentary Secretary 
to the Treasurer asking the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee to 
inquire into corporate responsibility and triple-bottom-line reporting. The Commit-
tee has been asked to inquire, amongst other things, into ‘the extent to which the 
current legal framework governing directors’ duties encourages or discourages 
them from having regard for the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders, 
and the broader community’.17  
 
It is possible to anticipate the difficulties posed by a proposal to include a statutory 
duty upon directors and senior managers to take account of employee interests 
generally. The precise scope and content of such a duty would be contentious and 
questions would be raised about the difficulties that arise when a duty to employees 
15 SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, COMPANY DIRECTORS 
DUTIES: REPORT ON THE SOCIAL AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANY DIRECTORS (THE COONEY 
REPORT), PARA 6.3 (1989). 
16 Id. Recommendation 8, at xii.  
17 PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE ON CORPORATION S AND FINANCIAL SERVICES, INQUIRY INTO 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, TERMS OF REFERENCE, at  
<www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/corporations_ctte> (accessed 28 July 2005). 
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conflicts with a duty to shareholders.18 However, a positive duty to ensure effective 
OHS management in the interests of the corporation’s workers (perhaps included in 
OHS legislation) would pose fewer difficulties of definition and scope. The most 
important consideration in arguing for a positive legal duty in the OHS sphere is the 
considerable capacity of directors to ensure good OHS management systems in 
their companies, in the same way that directors have the capacity to ensure the 
financial health and solvency of their companies through instituting and supervising 
proper financial management systems. Ultimate responsibility for occupational 
health and safety rests with top management; the commitment of senior managers 
and directors is fundamental to the success of health and safety management.19 
Inquiries into disasters such as the Zeebrugge ferry sinking have identified the 
central role played by directors in the failure of corporate systems leading to disas-
ter.20 Corporate activities can pose serious risks to workers or the public; when they 
do, good public policy demands that these risks be regulated. The price the corpora-
tion and its controllers pay for the freedom to do business is that ‘the conduct of the 
regulated actor will comply with and maintain a certain minimum standard of 
care’.21  
 
C Employment obligations of senior managers 
There are no specific principles of contract or equity that promote accountability for 
OHS by senior employees of companies. Senior managers and chief executive 
officers are employees of the company and the employment relationship is also a 
recognised fiduciary relationship.22 By analogy with directors’ fiduciary duties, a 
senior manager’s obligation is to act in the interests of the employer company and is 
not a duty owed to employees.  
 
Many companies, particularly larger ones, appoint managers with specific powers 
and duties to manage the company’s occupational health and safety program. The 
manager’s failure to do so with due skill and care will be a breach of his or her 
employment contract, giving the employer the right to discipline or dismiss the 
manager, depending on the terms of the contract an the circumstances of the breach. 
This is a matter of private contract law and privity of contract; the manager owes no 
duty to the employees who may be affected by his or her breach of contract, and 
18 A simple example would be the encouragement by directors of a friendly takeover that would advan-
tage shareholders, but would be likely to lead to worker redundancies.  
19 See CENTRE FOR CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 12, where the comments of the Health and 
Safety Executive and the British Standards Association to this effect are set out; see also Michael 
Quinlan, Managing Occupational Health and Safety in a Changing Environment, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROSECUTIONS (Richard Johnstone ed., 1996). 
20 See CENTRE FOR CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 12. 
21 R v Wholesale Travel Group Inc, [1991] 3 SCR 154; 4 OR (3D) 799 (Supreme Court of Ontario, 
1991). 
22 Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation, (1984) 156 CLR 41 (High Court of 
Australia, 1984). The extent of an employee’s obligation to act in the interests of the employer will 
depend on the seniority of the employee and the nature of his or her position. Senior managers have 
more extensive fiduciary obligations than do junior employees: see Colour Control Centre Pty Ltd v Ty, 
Supreme Court of NSW, 1689/93, unreported, 24 July 1995.  
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incurs no liability to them, unless the circumstances are such that the manager’s 
actions constitute a criminal offence or a regulatory offence under OHS legislation 
(discussed further below).  
 
D Criminal law 
There are very limited circumstances in which a senior manager or director might 
be liable under the general criminal law in Australia when a worker is killed or is 
seriously injured. The possible charges would be manslaughter by gross (or crimi-
nal) negligence in the case of a death at work, or negligently causing serious injury 
(with the wording of the relevant offences differing slightly in the criminal statutes 
from state to state).  
 
The criminal standard is set out in Nydam v R, where the essence of manslaughter 
was stated to involve a great falling short of the standard of care which a reasonable 
person would have exercised, involving such high risk that death or grievous bodily 
harm would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal punishment.23 The 
standard applies to situations where the defendant commits a positive act (such as 
requiring an employee to drive a truck, knowing that the truck had seriously faulty 
brakes, which resulted in the employee’s death when the truck went out of control 
on a downhill slope).24 The application of the law is more difficult when the death 
results from management’s failure to act, for example, by negligently failing to 
assess workplace risk and to ensure safe working procedures. In such cases, proof 
of the charge requires proof that the individual manager owed a duty of care to the 
deceased, that the defendant breached the duty, and that the departure from the 
proper standard of care was such as to warrant criminal punishment.25  
 
Other ways in which individual directors or managers may be held to have a duty to 
a deceased or seriously injured worker is by personally procuring, directing or 
authorising the company to commit the unlawful act that caused the death, or by 
acting towards the deceased so as to indicate that he or she undertakes a personal 
duty towards him or her.26 These circumstances are much more likely to be satisfied 
in very small companies, leaving the personnel in larger companies that have more 
complex management structures with the protection of the corporate veil.  
 
 In practice, there have been very few prosecutions and convictions of individuals 
(or corporations) for criminal offences in the workplace or public safety context in 
Australia.27 There has been a stronger trend in Britain over the last few years to 
23 Nydam v R, [1977] VR 430, 445 (Supreme Court of Victoria, 1977). 
24 These were the facts of The Queen v Denbo and Another, (Supreme Court of Victoria, 14 June 1994). 
The company pleaded guilty to manslaughter, in exchange for the DPP dropping the manslaughter 
charge against one of the two directors (who together effectively ran the company).  
25 R v Bateman,[1925] All ER 79. For a detailed discussion, see Hall, Johnstone, Ridgeway, supra note 
3, at 32- 33. 
26 Hall, Johnstone, Ridgeway, supra note 3, at 33, and the sources cited there. 
27 Id., at 12-14. 
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prosecute individual directors and managers for manslaughter, although the num-
bers are, proportionally, still small.28  
Industrial manslaughter offences 
The problems of common law liability can be overcome by statutory criminal 
offences specifically designed for the industrial context. There has been an ongoing 
debate in Australia, the UK, Canada and other countries for a decade about the need 
for more effective provisions to enable the prosecution of corporations and officers 
where the negligent conduct of company operations leads to the deaths of workers 
or members of the public. 
 
The Australian Capital Territory is the only jurisdiction to make industrial man-
slaughter offences part of the mainstream criminal law. Under the Crimes (Indus-
trial Manslaughter) Act 2003 (ACT), senior officers may be found guilty of 
industrial manslaughter only in very narrowly-defined circumstances – their acts or 
omissions must substantially contribute to the death of a worker and the senior 
officer’s conduct must be either reckless or negligent. Penalties for breach are a fine 
up to $200,000 or imprisonment up to 20 years, or both. The offence is so narrowly 
constructed that it is highly unlikely it will ever be prosecuted; this reduces the 
deterrent effect the provisions might otherwise have.29  
 
The ACT formulation is considerably narrower than the proposed senior officer 
offence in the failed Victorian Crimes (Workplace Deaths and Injuries) Bill 2001. 
In that Bill, a senior officer could be liable where the corporation had committed an 
offence, and the officer was ‘organisationally responsible’ for the conduct that 
resulted in the death or serious injury, and the officer materially contributed to its 
commission.30 It is submitted that this formulation is preferable to the very narrow 
one in the ACT legislation because it recognises the important responsibility senior 
officers have for OHS at the organisational level, whilst still requiring proof that the 
accused officer materially contributed to the death or serious injury. 
 
Some states have ‘industrial manslaughter’ type offences in their OHS statutes, or 
provide for higher penalties where death or serious injury results from a safety 






28 Supra note 3. 
29 RONALD MCCALLUM, P HALL, A HATCHER, A SEARLE, ADVICE IN RELATION TO WORKPLACE DEATH, 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY LEGISLATION AND OTHER MATTERS paras 42 – 49 (2004). 
30 Karen Wheelwright, Prosecuting corporations and officers for industrial manslaughter– recent 
Australian developments, 32 AUSTRALIAN BUS. L. REV.   239,  248 (2004). The Bill never became law. 
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E Directors’ and managers’ statutory liability for OHS         
failures  
State occupational health and safety legislation is the principal source of legal 
liability for individuals, although neither the Commonwealth nor ACT legislation 
provides for individual liability of officers or managers.31 The individuals to whom 
liability attaches in the remaining statutes include directors and other company 
officers, executive officers, persons ‘involved in the management’ of the corpora-
tion, and employees, with slight differences amongst the provisions in the precise 
groups of individuals to whom liability may attach. Some of the newer provisions 
apply to ‘persons’, indicating that they are not confined to corporate officers and 
managers.32 As with employer liability under OHS legislation, the liability is crimi-
nal rather than civil. Penalties are predominantly fines, but imprisonment is avail-
able for some offences under the Victorian, Western Australian and NSW acts.33  
 
The liability of individual directors and managers under OHS laws is generally 
dependent upon breach of duty by the employer. The employer is the primary duty 
holder under OHS legislation, not least because the employer ‘has the means to be 
able to promote the observance of this statutory objective’.34  Given that the vast 
majority of employers are incorporated, this is in practice a duty on incorporated 
business undertakings to provide, so far as is practicable, a working environment 
that is safe and without risks to health.35  The employer’s duty is personal and non-
delegable.36 About 90% of prosecutions are of employers.37
 
In practice, the employer’s duty can be implemented only through the acts of indi-
viduals - the directors, managers and employees of the employer company. Re-
search has indicated a strong link between management commitment to OHS and 
good OHS practice in organisations. In the view of one expert, the first principle of 
the five principles of good OHS management is demonstrated senior management 
commitment to OHS: 
 
It is impossible to conceive of an effective OHS management regime 
where senior management is not committed to this goal. Without such a 
commitment it is extremely unlikely either that resources and time will be 
31 The names of the statutes are set out supra note 4. 
32 See eg s 32 Occupational Heath and Safety Act 2004 (Vic). 
33 The new ‘industrial manslaughter’ offences in the NSW act provide for imprisonment instead of, or as 
well as a fine.  
34 Broken Hill Associated Smelters Pty Ltd v Stevenson, [1991] 42 IR 130, 145.  
35 This is the wording in s 21(1) of the OHS Act 2004 (Vic). The wording varies slightly from state to 
state.  For a comprehensive comparison, see R JOHNSTONE, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY LAW 
AND POLICY, ch 4 (2004). 
36 Workcover Authority of New South Wales v Thiess Pty Ltd, [2003] NSWIRComm 45 (New South 
Wales Industrial Relations Commission, 2003); Linework Ltd v Department of Labour, [2001] 2 NZLR 
639 (Supreme Court of New Zealand, 2001).  
37 RICHARD JOHNSTONE, SAFETY, COURTS AND CRIME, WORKING PAPER 6, NATIONAL RESEARCH 
CENTRE FOR OHS REGULATION, 8 (2002).  
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devoted to the issue or that lower levels of management will treat the mat-
ter seriously.  
 
The other four principles are as follows: 
• OHS management is integrated into core management and work ac-
tivities 
• OHS management uses a systems approach 
• The OHS management system addresses change 
• The management system values worker input.38 
 
Clearly each principle requires strong management commitment and positive action 
for its successful implementation. 
 
Can statutory liability provisions play a part in promoting management commitment 
to good OHS practice in organisations? To answer the question, it is important to 
consider in a little more detail the rationale for individual liability. 
  
III THE RATIONALE FOR INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY  
A The individual liability debate 
Legislation that places duties and imposes liabilities on corporations also commonly 
imposes liabilities on those individuals who direct and manage them. As well as 
occupational health and safety legislation, there are individual liability provisions in 
general corporations legislation, trade practices legislation and environmental 
protection legislation, to name just a few. Concerns are expressed from time to time 
by the business community and others that the range of statutory liabilities may 
result in inconsistent compliance burdens and increased costs for business, or that 
they may provide disincentives for directors to accept or continue to hold director-
ships. Such concerns prompted a reference by the federal government in July 2002 
to the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, requesting it to inquire into 
and make recommendations about the extent of directors’ liability under federal 
legislation.39  
 
These general concerns are not universally shared. In a recent report, the Australian 
Law Reform Commission considered that the principles of individual liability, in 
federal legislation at least, are clearly articulated in individual statutes and ‘do not 
appear to create any particular difficulties’.40 The Commission did acknowledge, 
38 Michael Quinlan, Managing Occupational Health and Safety in a Changing Environment, in NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROSECUTIONS 22-28. (Richard Johnstone 
ed.,1996) 
39 See <http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf>. The Committee produced a discussion paper 
‘Personal Liability for Corporate Fault’ in May 2005, with submissions on the paper closing in August 
2005.  
40 AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT 95 PRINCIPLED REGULATION para [8.35] (2002). 
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however, that important issues were raised by those statutes that deemed individuals 
liable for a contravention by the corporation simply on the basis that the individual 
is involved in management, without the need to prove individual fault.  
 
A further argument against wide-ranging officer and manager liability is that it 
erodes the protection given to directors and managers, thereby discouraging the use 
of companies as vehicles for economic activity, particularly by small businesses.41 
It needs to be remembered, however, that limited liability was provided to protect 
investors, not directors. Although in the ‘small business’ company investors and 
directors may be the same persons, the assumption that the protection of directors 
by the corporate form and limited liability is a natural and desirable consequence of 
the use of the corporate form for business activities is a questionable one.  
 
Can individual legal duties and liability provisions be justified in the OHS regula-
tory regime? The usual justifications for imposing criminal liability on individual 
officers and managers in the OHS area include: that this achieves specific and 
general deterrence, that it meets the community’s sense of justice, and that it is 
necessary to avoid some of the practical difficulties in implementing regulatory 
regimes against corporations. Properly-drafted provisions with supporting guidance 
may also positively encourage individuals to meet their obligations, rather than 
operating only negatively. The research evidence about the effectiveness of indi-
vidual liability provisions in meeting these aims is in some respects equivocal and 
confusing (see below), but there are nevertheless good reasons for imposing liabil-
ity on individuals within corporations. 
 
1 Deterrence 
In deterrence theory, the formal legal system is the essential element in the crime 
inhibition process. This is important as the primary purpose of prosecution of both 
organisations and individuals for OHS offences is deterrence, both general and 
specific.42  It follows then that ‘fear of detection, arrest and punishment resulting 
from conviction forms the core of a deterrence model’.43  In the legal regulation of 
corporate activities, the deterrence model assumes that corporations and their offi-
cers are rational actors who make calculated choices on a cost-benefit analysis 
about whether or not to comply with criminal laws.44  It follows that the less likely 
detection and prosecution are in practice, the less effective these laws are likely to 
be as a deterrent of undesirable behaviour.45  
 
41 N HAWKE, CORPORATE LIABILITY (2000).  
42 HALL, JOHNSTONE, RIDGEWAY, supra note 3, at 8. 
43 SALLY SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL CONTROL 9 (2002). 
44 The assumption of rational behaviour is not borne out by some empirical studies, which show that 
many other factors are at play.. See eg Terry Makkai & John Braithwaite, The Dialectics of Corporate 
Deterrence, 31 JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 347 (1994). 
45 It is important to bear in mind that Australian authorities prosecute only a tiny proportion of breaches 
of OHS laws. In 1995, the Industry Commission calculated that the expected penalty for an OHS of-
fender (individual and corporate) was less than $33, taking into account the likelihood that a breach 
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Other research shows that for some officers and managers, the mere possibility of 
individual prosecution and punishment may have the desired deterrent effect, and so 
we cannot necessarily assume that low levels of prosecution in practice dilute the 
law’s deterrent effect. Some Australian research into individual OHS offending has 
indicated that when managers distinguish between prosecutions of corporate entities 
and prosecutions of individual directors and managers, it is the possibility of indi-
vidual liability ‘which is by far the most important motivating factor …personal 
liability [is the issue] about which directors express most concern and which … 
motivates the compliance program more than anything else’.46  
 
The nature of penalties appears to be important in deterrence. Officers of corpora-
tions continued to be concerned about the possibility of imprisonment under envi-
ronmental legislation eight years after tough new penalties were introduced, in spite 
of the fact that no senior officers had been convicted of a serious offence or impris-
oned. This concern motivated their compliance with environmental audits and due 
diligence obligations.47 Penalties such as fines, imprisonment, probation, commu-
nity service orders, disqualification of directors and adverse publicity ‘may have a 
very considerable specific and general deterrent effect on individual managers and 
directors’.48 There is support for the effectiveness of individual criminal sanctions 
in improving corporate behaviour more generally. The Australian Law Reform 
Commission considered that generally individual liability encourages greater trans-
parency in management processes and improves accountability and performance 
standards of the organisations which the individuals manage.49 Academics have also 
argued that the imposition of liability, particularly criminal liability, on individual 
directors and managers may be an important spur to improved corporate govern-
ance in organisations.50  
 
The deterrent effect of individual liability provisions in regulatory law, including 
OHS law, is complicated by the complex relationship between the corporation and 
individual actors within it.  In her book Corporate Crime, Law and Social Control, 
Simpson argues that managers are socialized into organisational goals and a man-
ager’s decision to knowingly break the law ‘may be supported by operational norms 
and organizational subcultures.’51 Perceptions of organisational needs have been 
shown empirically to influence the corporate offending decision. Illegality is not 
pursued for individual benefits but for organisational ends; the decisions of indi-
vidual managers are affected by organisational contingencies, priorities and needs, 
 
would be detected, prosecuted and punished: see the discussion in NEIL GUNNINGHAM AND RICHARD 
JOHNSTONE, REGULATING WORKPLACE SAFETY: SYSTEMS AND SANCTIONS 187 (1999). 
46 Andrew Hopkins, Making Prosecutions More Effective in OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY 
PROSECUTIONS IN AUSTRALIA: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES (Richard Johnstone ed, 1994). 
47 GUNNINGHAM & JOHNSTONE, supra n 45, at 188-189. 
48 JOHNSTONE, supra n 35, at 427. 
49 ALRC, above n 40. 
50 Jennifer Hill, Corporate Criminal Liability in Australia: An Evolving Corporate Governance Tech-
nique? in J. BUS. L. 1 [2003]. Hill’s main focus was on the new forms of liability in the Criminal Code 
Act, 1995 (Cth).  
51 SIMPSON, supra n 43, at 7. 
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rather than personal needs. Accordingly, in order to understand whether corporate 
crime is amenable to deterrence, ‘one needs to examine how managers experience 
and express the moral imperatives of their work environment and how organisa-
tional needs are formulated and inculcated into managerial decisions’.52  
 
Whilst the deterrent effect of the law on corporate officer offending is clearly a 
complex area, we should not abandon the notion that individual liability provisions 
can have a positive effect on OHS compliance by organisations. We do need to 
acknowledge however: 
 
that there are different types of organisations, with different organisational 
structures and decision-making processes, with the result that criminal 
sanctions will differ in their deterrent impact upon the organizations and 
the individuals within them.53
 
It is also important to recognise that individuals in organisations, like individuals 
outside of them, are motivated to comply with the law for reasons other than fear of 
criminal prosecution and punishment. These factors include moral habituation, 
threats to reputation and employment status, friendship and family attachment. 
Traditional deterrence neglects these kinds of controls, although they can be recog-
nised in compliance strategies that do not rely heavily on prosecution of offenders.54
 
2 Social condemnation and ‘just deserts’  
Community perceptions of the seriousness of corporate crime have increased over 
time, with 74% of respondents to a recent US survey ranking worker health and 
safety crimes to be serious.55 The agitation over the last 10 years for more effective 
principles of corporate liability, particularly in the general criminal law, reflects this 
change in perception.  
 
Individual accountability and punishment may be as important, if not more impor-
tant, than corporate accountability in expressing the social condemnation and ‘just 
deserts’ functions of the law, and to satisfy public demands for retribution, particu-
larly in areas where deaths or serious injuries of workers or members of the public 
have resulted from organisational and individual management failure or neglect.56 
The corporation, after all, has ‘no soul to damn, and no body to kick’, and the most 
common penalty, a monetary fine, cannot be guaranteed to have the necessary 
deterrent and punitive effect, particularly for a well-resourced corporation. Even 
with the development of more creative and effective corporate penalties, such as 
publicity orders, community service orders, equity fines and enforceable undertak-
52 Id., at 7- 9. 
53 GUNNINGHAM & JOHNSTONE, supra n 45, at 190. 
54 SIMPSON, supra n 43, 9-10, ch 6. 
55 Id., at 3. 
56 Celia Wells, Corporate killing, NEW L. J. 1467, 1467 (1997).  
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ings, individual accountability may still reflect more effectively the community 
perception that justice is being done.57
 
3 Practical problems with reliance on corporate liability  
Finally, the availability of prosecution of individuals within corporations is impor-
tant, because targeting the corporation alone has shortcomings. The flexibility of 
the corporate form can pose a danger that a company may be wound up and its fines 
not paid.58 The artificial nature of the corporation means that it is resistant to the 
effect of the usual range of criminal penalties; obviously it cannot be imprisoned, 
but as already noted, even heavy fines may have little or no effect on a well-
resourced company. Some companies indeed budget for them as one of the usual 
costs of doing business. They can also be readily passed on to others, such as con-
sumers of the company’s goods and services. The development of a more creative 
range of penalties will go some way to addressing this problem.59
 
It does not follow that individual liability should therefore replace corporate liabil-
ity. A system based around individual liability alone also has problems, not least of 
which is the ability of larger corporations in particular, if they are inclined to do so, 
to make it difficult if not impossible for investigators to identify culpable individu-
als when there is a safety failure (or, conversely, to direct blame to certain individu-
als who are not necessarily solely culpable, because of internal company politics). 
There may also be situations where there are no individuals who can be said to be 
sufficiently culpable to warrant prosecution – the safety failure may be the result of 
the interplay of various acts or omissions of numerous individuals and groups. 
Individual liability alone will be inadequate in such cases, unless we adopt a model 
that deems individuals CEOs and directors automatically liable because of a safety 
failure by the organisation, without the benefit of any due diligence defences. There 
must be a balance between corporate and individual liability.   
IV FORMS OF INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY UNDER THE                             
OHS STATUTES 
A Overview 
In all but the ACT and the Commonwealth, OHS legislation provides for the prose-
cution of individual managers and officers for the failure to have safe and healthy 
workplaces. The legislation has been described generally as ‘piercing the corporate 
veil and attributing a form of primary liability, concurrently with the corporation, to 
57 Harry Glasbeek, Criminal Law as a Political Tool, 11 AUST. J. LABOUR L. 95 (1998). 
58 This happened in The Queen v Denbo Pty Ltd, (unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria 14 June 1994), 
where a company pleaded guilty to manslaughter but wound up in insolvency, leaving the fine unpaid.  
59 JONATHAN CLOUGH  & CARMEL MULHERN, THE PROSECUTION OF  CORPORATIONS, ch 5 (2002). 
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its directors and managers’.60 In addition, three states provide for additional of-
fences or penalties for individuals where a safety breach involves recklessness, 
gross negligence or results in death or serious injury to a worker. 
 
The forms of individual liability differ somewhat from state to state; this contrasts 
with the duties imposed upon employers, which are reasonably consistent across the 
different statutes. At the very least, this poses problems for companies that operate 
in different states. It may also indicate a lack of clarity amongst policy makers and 
legislators working in the same area about what is the most desirable and effective 
form of individual liability.  
 
In summary, the main forms of liability are as follows: 
 
1 officer consents or connives in corporation’s offence, or           
offence due to officer’s neglect 
This form of individual liability appears in the Work Health Act 1986 (NT) (s 180) 
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 (WA) (s 55).61  Where an offence 
against the Act is committed by a body corporate, the officer or manager is also 
guilty where the offence was committed with his or her consent, connivance or as a 
result of his or her neglect, or ‘wilful neglect’. The burden falls on the prosecution 
to establish that the officer consented, connived or demonstrated the necessary 
degree of neglect.  
 
2 officer is deemed to have contravened the Act if the corpora-
tion has contravened, subject to defences 
The best example of this form is in the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 
(NSW) (s 26). This section provides that, where a corporation contravenes, whether 
by act or omission, any provision of the Act or regulations, each director/manager  
is taken to have contravened the same provision, unless the person satisfies the 
court that: 
a) he or she was not in a position to influence the conduct of the corporation 
in relation to its contravention of the provisions; or 
b) he or she, being in such  position, used all due diligence to prevent the con-
travention by the corporation. 
 
The burden of proof in the NSW act is on the director or manager, on the balance of 
probabilities. The Authority cannot rely on a successful prosecution of the corpora-
tion to secure a penalty against a director or other individual referred to in that 
section; the individual must be proceeded against separately from the corporation. 
60 HAROLD FORD, R P AUSTIN, I M RAMSAY, COMPANY DIRECTORS: PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 610 (12th ed., 2005). 
61 A similar offence appeared in  s 53 of the OHS Act 1985 (Vic). 
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However, the director or manager may be found guilty whether or not the corpora-
tion has been proceeded against or found guilty.62  
 
Section 167 of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld) provides that the 
executive officers of a corporation must ensure that the corporation complies with 
the Act. Evidence that the corporation has been convicted of an offence against a 
provision of the Act is evidence that each of the executive officers committed the 
offence of ‘failing to ensure that the corporation complies with the provision’ (s 
167(3)). As with the NSW provisions, it is  a defence for an executive officer to 
prove that he or she was not in a position to influence the corporation’s conduct, or, 
being in such a position, ‘exercised reasonable diligence to ensure the corporation 
complied with the provision’ (s 167(3) – (4)). 
 
A broadly similar offence appears in s 53 of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 
1995 (Tas). The Tasmanian provision applies only to directors (but the Tasmanian 
act also has ‘responsible officer’ provisions – see below). A director has available 
the defence of ‘all due diligence’, as well as the defence that the body corporate 
contravened the provision without the director’s knowledge and that the director 
was not reasonably able to acquire that knowledge. 
 
3 officer contravenes Act where body corporate’s contraven-
tion is attributable to an officer failing to take reasonable care  
This approach is exemplified by s 144 of the new Occupational Health and Safety 
Act 2004 (Vic). This form of liability is quite different from NSW and Queensland 
in that the onus remains on the prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt 
that the body corporate’s contravention ‘is attributable to an officer of the body 
corporate failing to take reasonable care’(s 144(1)). The burden is not on the officer 
to show due diligence. In determining whether an officer is guilty of an offence, 
regard must be had to: 
a) what the officer knew about the matter concerned; and 
b) the extent of the officer’s ability to make, or participate in the making of, 
decisions that affect the body corporate in relation to the matters con-
cerned; and 
c) whether the contravention by the body corporate is also attributable to an 
act or omission of any other person; and 
d) any other relevant matter.63  
 
Like NSW, the officer can be proceeded against only if the body corporate has 
contravened a provision of the Act of regulations, although the officer may be 
convicted whether or not the body corporate has been proceeded against or found 
guilty (s 144(1), 144(4)).  
 
62 Veisis v Stand By Two Pty Ltd, (1993) 49 IR 432 (Marks J); OHS Act 2000, (NSW), s 26(2). 
63 See s 144(3). 
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4  ‘responsible officer’ contravenes if he or she fails to take 
reasonable steps to ensure corporation’s compliance 
Both the South Australian and Tasmanian acts require the appointment of ‘respon-
sible officers’.  Under s 61 of the Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act 
1986 (SA), the corporation must appoint one or more responsible officers who must 
take reasonable steps to ensure compliance by the body corporate with its obliga-
tions under the Act.  If no responsible officer is appointed, each officer of the body 
corporate is deemed to be a responsible officer. A responsible officer is not deemed 
to have contravened the Act if the body corporate contravenes, but it is an offence 
for a responsible officer not to take reasonable steps to ensure the body corporate’s 
compliance.  
 
Section 10 of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Tas) requires the em-
ployer (which is apparently not confined to bodies corporate) to appoint someone 
with sufficient authority to perform the employer’s duties at each of the employer’s 
workplaces. The employer is to ensure that a responsible officer has sufficient 
authority to perform the duties of a responsible officer. In the absence of an ap-
pointed responsible officer, the person responsible for the direction and manage-
ment of the business is deemed to be appointed as the responsible officer. It is a 
contravention if the responsible officer’ fails to ‘perform the duties of his or her 
employer under this Act at the workplace for which he or she is the responsible 
officer’. A number of defences are available, including that it was not reasonably 
practicable for the responsible officer to perform that duty; or the failure to perform 
the duty was due to causes over which the responsible officer had no control, or the 
responsible officer used all due diligence ‘to prevent the failure to perform the duty’ 
(s 11).  
5 Offences tied to the result of the safety breach 
The new Occupational Health and Safety Amendment (Workplace Deaths) Act 2005 
(NSW) introduces a new offence of ‘reckless conduct causing death at the work-
place by a person with OHS duties’ for both corporations and individuals. Individu-
als will be guilty of the new offence if they engage in conduct that causes the death 
of another person, have an obligation under the OHS Act 2000 (NSW) for the health 
and safety of that person, and are reckless about the danger of death or serious 
injury to the person to whom that duty is owed.64 The OHS Act 2004 (Vic) intro-
duces a new offence of recklessly engaging, without lawful excuse, in conduct that 
places or may place another person who is at a workplace in danger of serious 
injury (s 32).65 In other acts, penalties are heavier where the safety breach results in 
death or serious injury (see further below). 
 
64 Occupational Health and Safety Amendment (Workplace Deaths) Act 2005, Schedule 1.  
65 The wording of the offence is such that it is not aimed just at officers and managers. 
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B  Other provisions 
Each of the OHS statutes imposes duties on employees which may, at least in 
theory, apply to managers and chief executives of companies. For example, the 
Victorian Act imposes on employees a duty (amongst other things) to ‘take reason-
able care for the health and safety of persons who may be affected by the em-
ployee’s acts or omissions at workplace’ (s 25((1)(b)). On a plain reading, these 
provisions could be used to prosecute defaulting managers, but it is unclear how 
likely this will be. Such provisions have been used to prosecute supervisors how-
ever.66 A senior manager might be prosecuted under the new s 32 of the Victorian 
act in appropriately egregious circumstances.  
 
C Penalties for individuals 
The principal penalty for individuals convicted of the ‘director/manager’ offences 
outlined is a fine, but increasingly imprisonment is an option where the safety 
breach results in death.  
 
The maximum fine varies considerably depending on the legislation in question. 
Currently, the highest fines are provided in the new Victorian Act, which provides 
for a maximum fine of $184,050 where the body corporate’s contravention of the 
duty to provide a safe workplace (s 21) is attributable to the officer’s failure to take 
reasonable care. In Victoria, breach of s 32 is a maximum fine of $184,050, as well 
as, or instead of, a maximum of 5 years’ imprisonment. 
 
Increasingly, fines are linked to the seriousness of the result of the safety breach. 
Under the Queensland Act, an individual may be fined up to $150,000 where the 
offence causes multiple deaths. The Western Australian legislation provides for 
fines up to $250,000 for a first offence and up to $312,500 for a subsequent offence 
in the case of the most serious offences (gross negligence resulting in serious injury 
or death). In such cases, an individual is liable to imprisonment for 2 years. Under 
the NSW Act, where the conduct of a person with OHS duties causes the death of 
another person at any place of work, and the person is reckless as to the danger of 
death or serious injury, that person my be fined up to $165,000, and/or be impris-
oned for a period of up to 5 years.67
 
It is important to remember that maximum fines provided in the legislation may be 
substantially reduced where the offence is indictable but is prosecuted in a local or 
magistrates’ court. Also, maximum penalties set by legislation do not give a realis-
tic picture of the likely penalties on conviction. Research on penalties and sentenc-
ing generally for OHS offences in Victoria shows that average fines throughout the 
1990s were as little as 21.6% of the possible maximum.68 In NSW, fines over the 
66 In Victoria, two supervisors were successfully prosecuted for their ill-treatment of apprentices at their 
workplace, which included setting one alight, under s 25 of the OHS Act 1985 (Vic). 
67 OHS Amendment (Workplace Deaths) Act 2005 (NSW), Schedule 1. 
68 JOHNSTONE, supra n 37, at 10. The data does not separate out fines for individuals and corporations.  
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period 1986 – 2003 averaged between 10 and 20 per cent of the maximum, with a 
penalty of more than 50% of the maximum being imposed in very few cases.69 The 
recent inquiry into the Western Australian legislation made similar findings. 
 
Some state legislation provides some further penalty options eg publicity orders 
under s 115 of the NSW act and adverse publicity orders, orders to undertake im-
provement projects and release on giving a health and safety undertaking in the 
Victorian act. 
 
V CRITIQUE OF THE INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY MODELS 
A The range of individuals who may face prosecution 
The liability provisions in the state statutes apply variously to ‘directors’, ‘officers’, 
‘executive officers’ and ‘persons concerned in the management’ of the employer 
corporation. The ‘responsible officer’ model places liability on persons nominated 
or deemed ‘responsible officers’ for the purposes of the OHS provisions.  
 
The term ‘officer’ is generally defined consistently with general corporations legis-
lation, and may include directors, secretaries and executive officers, both de jure 
and de facto (see eg s 5 OHS Act 2004 (Vic)). The expression ‘persons concerned in 
the management’ of an employer corporation has a less certain meaning. Case law 
suggests that the phrase ‘concerned in the management’ is not confined to persons 
who have the central direction of the company’s affairs.70 To be concerned in man-
agement, the person must however have some substantial degree of responsibility 
for the company’s operations generally, or for a significant part of the business.71 It 
is acknowledged that individual responsibility and liability depends upon the man-
ager’s seniority and his or her capacity to deal with OHS issues: 
 
…the greater the degree of responsibility within the corporate hierarchy 
and the greater the ability to rectify the problem the greater the degree of 
culpability which results. Once senior management becomes aware of the 
problem or once circumstances existed which should have resulted in 
management appreciating that there was a problem, the degree of culpabil-
ity of the defendant increases accordingly.72
 
It is vital that officers and managers know in advance of their legal liabilities and 
this might be achieved by expanding the legislative definition of ‘concerned in the 
management’ to increase certainty about which managers may face liability. 
 
69 MCCALLUM et al, supra n 29, at paras 14-15. 
70 Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Bracht, [1989] VR 821.  
71 Landeryou v Taylor, (1969) FLR 149. 
72 WorkCover Authority of NSW v Goodman Fielder Mills Ltd, Industrial Court of NSW, Marks J, 30 
November 1994. 
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B What factors are important in assessing the efficacy of 
legislative provisions? 
The models need to be measured against some principles to determine their effec-
tiveness. The statutory provisions should: 
 
• make it clear that organizational responsibility for good OHS man-
agement rests with directors and senior management 
• as far as possible promote a proactive approach to OHS in by directors 
and senior management in organizations 
• recognize the interrelationship between breaches of duty by the or-
ganization and management failure 
• provide for director/manager liability only with proof of individual 
fault (although casting the proof of defences like ‘due diligence’ on 
the officer is not contrary to this principle) 
• provide penalties that reflect the seriousness of OHS breaches and 
provide for a sufficiently deterrent effect 
• be prosecuted appropriately, to ensure in particular a general deterrent 
effect.73 
C The deemed contravention, subject to defences like due 
diligence model 
The ‘deemed contravention, subject to defences like due diligence’ form of liability 
exemplified by s 26 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW) is 
preferred of the existing models, although some there are difficulties with it, par-
ticularly with respect to ensuring the accountability of directors and managers of 
larger companies.   
 
There are a very small number of reported cases in the NSW jurisdiction from 
which some tentative conclusions can be drawn. First, the reported cases involve 
small companies in which the director or manager charged was directly involved in 
the day to day business operations, and the injuries caused (or breach of safety) 
were very serious.74 It is much more common for ‘operational’ directors in small 
companies to be prosecuted than those in larger organisations: 
 
…it appears that directors and managers of small to medium-sized compa-
nies may face greater exposure under the provisions of s 26 of the Act. This 
arises in part because of their greater involvement in the operational aspects 
of a corporation’s activities – as such, their individual acts or omissions are 
73 A number of these principles are set out and further elaborated upon in MCCALLUM et al, supra n 29, 
at paras 192-214. 
74 See eg Workcover Authority of New South Wales v RJ Waugh, (1995) 59 IR 89 (New South Wales 
Industrial Relations Commission, 1995); Workcover Authority of New South Wales v CI & D Industries 
Pty Ltd, [1995] NSWIRC 220; Inspector Brian Dell v Vidler, [2003] NSWIRComm 267. 
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more apparent than in the case of larger corporations, which may have com-
plex organisational structures in place.75
 
There is some evidence that smaller companies may, overall, have poorer OHS 
standards,76 but it is not clear whether authorities take this into account in determin-
ing the general deterrent effect of prosecuting small as opposed to big business. It 
may be that it is simply more difficult to successfully prosecute larger corporations, 
particularly if organisations wish to obfuscate individual liability. Thus the statutory 
provisions possess the same weakness as the general criminal law, which also 
makes prosecuting larger companies more problematic than smaller ones.77
 
The NSW Commission hearing these matters does not take an overly narrow ap-
proach to interpreting the concept of due diligence (the main defence litigated in the 
cases); it recognises that OHS requires a systematic approach to assessing and 
dealing with risk, and that due diligence on the part of management involves ensur-
ing proper safety systems are in place. In WorkCover Authority of NSW (Insp Tyler) 
v John Anthony Brown, Brown was the director and senior on-site representative of 
a demolition contracting company. Although absent on the day of the safety breach 
(collapse of a scaffold on which demolition work was carried out), as on-site man-
ager, Brown was in a position to influence the company’s conduct in respect of all 
matters going to the alleged contraventions. The system of work was manifestly 
unsafe and the director failed to display all due diligence.78 In WorkCover Authority 
of NSW (Insp  Blake) v Dilario, the magistrate observed that the company had laid 
down a safe system of work and had delegated certain supervisory responsibilities 
to competent and trusted persons. The directors regularly visited the site and: 
 
…exercising due diligence would have observed [that] the system …was not 
being observed. They had laid down a safe system, they were in a position 
to ensure the system was enforced but they failed to ensure the system was 
maintained.79
 
The due diligence defence succeeded however in WorkCover Authority of NSW 
(Insp Dowling) v Barry John Coster. Here the evidence indicated that the director 
took a proactive approach to health and safety on site during the shopping centre 
renovations. He was an ‘active and receptive participant’ in the affairs of the site 
safety committee. He presided over safety personnel of whom he required vigilance 
and personally inspected the safety fencing to ensure it was adequate. He ensured 
that there was a proper response taken to the prohibition notices placed on the site 
by WorkCover inspectors.  The safety breach occurred in spite of these precautions.  
 
75 WENDY THOMPSON, UNDERSTANDING THE NSW OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT 82  (3RD 
ed 2001). 
76 FIONA HAINES, CORPORATE REGULATION: BEYOND PUNISH OR PERSUADE  20-21 (1997). 
77 HALL, JOHNSTONE, RIDGEWAY, supra n 3, at 35-36. 
78 THOMPSON, supra n 75, at 83. 
79 CIMC matter no 96/1307-1308, Miller CIM, cited in THOMPSON, supra n 75, at 84-85. 
491   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 10 NO 2 
 
                                                          
The concept of ‘due diligence’ is generally well-known in the business community 
as a measure of compliance with a range of statutory responsibilities and provides 
an objective measure of adherence to standards. The limited case law does suggest 
that due diligence in the OHS context means a minimum standard of behaviour 
involving the proactive development of a safe system of work that meets the statu-
tory duty to provide, so far as is reasonably practicable, a workplace that is safe and 
without risks to health, plus adequate supervision and monitoring ensuring that the 
system is properly carried out.80 Due diligence also requires that directors and 
managers should immediately and personally react when they have notice that the 
system has failed. 81 The Industry Commission endorsed the model as the preferred 
one for managerial liability under OHS laws. There is little doubt, however, that 
positive guidance to directors and managers on what due diligence requires as a 
matter of day-to-day practice in OHS is useful and important to the development 
maintenance of proper safety standards. 
 
The burden of proof is properly cast on the defendant officer, on the balance of 
probabilities. The fact that a director or senior manager may need to demonstrate 
due diligence is more likely to promote compliance with the legislation - officers 
and senior managers have a stronger motivation to ensure that their companies have 
proper and transparent policies in place for the assessment of risk and proper plans 
for risk elimination and minimisation.  
 
D Officer causes corporation’s breach by failing to take 
reasonable care 
Whilst in theory an improvement on the officer provisions in the 1985 Act, these 
new provisions in s 144 of the OHS Act 2004 (Vic) cast a very substantial burden 
on the prosecution. It will be necessary to prove both the causal link between the 
officer’s lack of reasonable care and the corporation’s offence, and to establish 
what, in all the circumstances, ‘reasonable care’ might involve. The factors to be 
taken into account in determining reasonable care include ‘what the officer knew 
about the matter concerned’ and ‘whether the contravention by the body corporate 
is also attributable to an act or omission of any other person’. It is submitted that 
such considerations encourage an approach that considers the immediate cause of 
safety breaches rather than also considering the importance of proper risk manage-
ment systems overall and management responsibility for such systems.82 They may 
also enable managers in large companies to put cursory ‘paper systems’ of OHS 
management in place, and blame supervisors or employees for the failure to imple-
ment them. It is suggested that the chances of establishing guilt in all but the most 
serious cases of negligence by working directors in small companies  is slight under 
this formulation. 
80 Universal Telecasters (Queensland) v Guthrie, (1978) 18 ALR 531 (Federal Court of Australia, 1978). 
81 THOMPSON, supra n 75, at 84- 85. R v Bata Industries Ltd , 9 OR (3d) 329; 1992 Ont Rep LEXIS 223 
(Ontario Court Provincial Division, 1992). 
82 The importance of a systematic approach to the causes of workplace accidents was addressed by Neil 
Gunningham in SAFEGUARDING THE WORKER (1986) and GUNNINGHAM & JOHNSTONE, supra n 45. 
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E ‘Consent, connivance, wilful neglect’ 
The ‘consent or connivance’ formulation used in the Western Australian and NT 
provisions is unjustifiably narrow and fails to strike a good balance between corpo-
rate and individual liability. It fails to recognise that management responsibility for 
OHS should extend more widely than merely avoiding deliberate connivance in, or 
consent to, the corporation’s offence, if deaths and injuries are to be minimised. The 
terms ‘consent, connivance or wilful neglect’ mean that liability will be established 
only in the most egregious of circumstances.83 Such a formulation is insufficient to 
deter lax management practices in risk assessment and implementation of safety 
standards that fall short of gross negligence but which contribute to deaths and 
injuries at work. 
F Responsible officer 
The requirement in the South Australian provisions that the responsible officer 
‘take reasonable steps to ensure compliance’ by the employer potentially provides 
for managerial liability in wider circumstances than consent or connivance. How-
ever, the legislation gives no guidance on what ‘reasonable steps’ might be and a 
code of practice or guidance note would be necessary.  
 
The Tasmanian provisions give greater guidance by using concepts of ‘due dili-
gence’ and ‘lack of control’, but the provisions are weakened by the officer’s con-
travention being a ‘failure to perform’ rather than the legislation imposing a 
positive duty on those individuals who have the capacity to ensure compliance. 
 
Vesting legal liability in a nominated ‘responsible officer’, as in the Tasmanian 
provisions, can work well only if there can be certainty that such a nominee will be 
given adequate resources to meet the statutory requirements of the position. The 
existence of a statutory position of ‘responsible officer’ might in some organisa-
tions be an excuse to divert responsibility away from those with the real authority to 
deal with OHS properly – the board and the CEO.  The Tasmanian Act requires the 
employer to ensure that the responsible officer has sufficient authority to perform 
the employer’s duties under the Act. It deems the CEO to be responsible in the 
event there is no appointment for the purposes of the Act. Unless a responsible 
officer with express statutory functions has the power and resources to ensure safety 




83 For a recent discussion of the wording, see AB Oxford Cold Storage v Arnott , [2003] VSC 452 
(Supreme Court of Victoria, 2003), in which the Supreme Court overturned the guilty finding of the 
Magistrate against a director of the company. See also CHRIS MAXWELL QC, REVIEW OF THE 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT 1985 (VIC) para [758]  (2004). 
84 JAMES GOBERT AND MAURICE PUNCH,  RETHINKING CORPORATE CRIME 271 (2003). 
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G A proposal for an improved model of individual liability  
McCallum et al proposed a new provision to improve manager liability under OHS 
legislation. The proposal is based on three principles. The first is the introduction of 
a code of practice with statutory force. The purpose of the code would be to ‘both 
define and impose obligations on senior management personnel thereby encourag-
ing and indeed mandating a proactive approach to safety and which would have the 
effect of limiting avenues of escape from liability’.85 The deeming provision in s 26 
of the NSW act would remain, as would the defences, with reliance on the defences 
‘limited and circumscribed by the Code of Practice and demonstrated compliance 
by directors and managers with their obligations under the Code’.86  
 
The clear advantage of this proposed model is that is accompanied by detailed 
written advice that would be designed to promote a proactive approach to OHS 
management and would make it less likely that the directors and managers of larger 
organizations could escape liability. 
H Individual liability in practice and the need for more 
prosecutions of individuals 
Data indicates that very few individuals are prosecuted overall. Johnstone estimates 
that only 15% of total prosecutions in Australia (which themselves represent only a 
tiny proportion of breaches overall) in the 1990s were of individuals.87 In Victoria, 
for example, in the period 1990 – 1995, the total number of individual prosecutions 
was 14, and this figure includes offences other than the officer offence (such as 
hindering inspectors).88 New South Wales appears to prosecute more individuals 
than other states. 
 
Anecdotal evidence about the types of cases in which directors and managers are 
prosecuted can be gleaned from publications like the Victorian WorkCover Author-
ity’s annual prosecutions publication89and from the cases that are now available 
online. The individuals prosecuted in NSW, the busiest state jurisdiction, are man-
aging directors, other senior managers or senior employees with a supervisory role, 
whose acts or omissions have contributed directly to the safety breach. This is 
consistent with the policy of the NSW WorkCover Authority to prosecute individ-
ual defendants taking into account who is ‘primarily responsible’ for the alleged 
offence, what was the culpability of the proposed defendant and the effectiveness of 
85 MCCALLUM et al, supra  n 29, para 192 
86 Id. at para 191. 
87 JOHNSTONE, supra n 37, 8. 
88 Virginia Whalen, Individual Liability of Corporate Officers, and Corporate Manslaughter and Other 
Offences: Overview of Provisions ad Statistics, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND 
SAFETY PROSECUTIONS  8 (Richard Johnstone ed., 1996). 
89 See <www.workcover.vic.gov.au/pubs> (last visited 11 July 2005). 
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any court order that might be made against the proposed defendant.90 As has been 
pointed out above, however, these individuals are far more likely to be involved in 
small companies. 
VI NON-LEGAL INITIATIVES FOR IMPROVING COMPLIANCE 
This paper argues for stronger legal mechanisms to promote compliance with OHS 
laws by directors and senior managers. It is important to recognise however that the 
OHS compliance systems implemented by state government authorities are based 
heavily on achieving compliance through encouragement, persuasion and advice to 
dutyholders. Legal sanctions are at the top of the ‘compliance pyramid’ and used as 
a last resort against those for whom persuasion has proven to be ineffective, or in 
the most serious cases of safety breaches (eg where deaths or serious injuries re-
sult).  
 
Non-legal approaches should be used as part of overall compliance strategies where 
there is evidence that they might contribute to achieving better compliance with 
OHS requirements at board and senior management level. Certainly voluntary 
approaches to improve corporate governance and to promote corporate social re-
sponsibility have been popular with many, although voluntary compliance also has 
its strong critics.91
 
Promoting the role of board directors in OHS has recently been a focus of activity 
by the Health and Safety Executive and the Health and Safety Commission in the 
United Kingdom. The success of the HSE may provide guidance for other jurisdic-
tions like Australia in fostering greater board commitment as part of strategies to 
improve OHS compliance in organisations. As part of its Revitalising Health and 
Safety strategy, the HSE has developed a voluntary code of practice on directors’ 
responsibilities for health and safety. This step was taken to foster the HSC’s goal 
of ‘promoting and encouraging greater corporate responsibility and accountability 
for occupational health and safety’.92 The HSC has actively promoted use of the 
code through conference presentations, press coverage and holding discussions with 
the most senior executives and board members in top UK companies. It is also 
promoting the inclusion of OHS reporting to shareholders in company annual 
reports.  
 
The guidance is designed to impress on board members of all types of organisations 
that effective management of health and safety risks is an essential part of effective 
corporate governance. It is aimed at directors and all members of top-level man-
90 WORKCOVER AUTHORITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES, POLICY AND PROSECUTION GUIDELINES (2004), 
<www.workcover.nsw.gov.au>, 22 (last visited October 2004). 
91 See eg, S Gregg, Stakeholder Theory: What it Means for Corporate Governance, POLICY, WINTER 
(JUN-AUG) 2001, <www.cis.org.au/Policy/winter01/polwin01-7.htm>, where it is argued that stakeholder 
theory is an incoherent and implausible guide to how corporations act or should act. 
92 HEALTH AND SAFETY COMMISSION, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY: A PROGRESS REPORT ON HSC/E INITIATIVES AND MEASURES,         
(24 September 2003), available at <www.hse.gov.uk>.  
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agement who provide strategic leadership, direction and oversight and set the policy 
on health and safety. The guidance sets out how effective management of OHS 
risks can maximise the well-being and productivity of workers, prevent deaths and 
injuries, improve the organisation’s reputation, avoid damaging effects on turnover 
and profitability, encourage better relationships with contractors, and minimise the 
likelihood of prosecution and penalties. It consists of 5 ‘action points’, as follows: 
 
1. The board needs to accept formally and publicly its collective role in pro-
viding health and safety leadership in its organisation 
2. Each member of the board needs to accept their individual role in provid-
ing health and safety leadership for their organisation 
3. The board needs to ensure that all board decisions reflect its health and 
safety intentions, as articulated in the health and safety policy statement 
4. The board needs to recognise its role in engaging the active participation 
of workers in improving health and safety, and 
5. The board needs to ensure that it is kept informed of, and alert to, relevant 
health and safety risk management issues. The HSC recommends that 
boards appoint one of their number to be the ‘health and safety director’. 
 
The guidance goes on to explain what practical steps can be taken to fulfil each of 
the action points, as well as summarising the company’s legal responsibilities under 
the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and providing sources of further informa-
tion.  
 
Recent research shows an increase in the number of companies that have board-
level health and safety management arrangements since the introduction of the 
guidance. There had been an increase of 8% in the percentage of surveyed compa-
nies having direction of OHS from board level since the promulgation of the guid-
ance, with a total of 66% of companies overall having these arrangements. These 
arrangements are more common in larger firms, with 75% of the top 350 corpora-
tions having specific board level direction and oversight. There was an increase in 
the number of respondents who believed that board level direction of OHS repre-
sented best practice.93  
 
Given the success of the British initiative, similar education programs are worthy of 
consideration by OHS authorities around Australia, or by the National Occupational 
Health and Safety Commission as a cost-effective adjunct to existing measures 
designed to promote OHS compliance in the absence of enforceable codes of prac-
tice on director and manager responsibilities. There are some initiatives in the states 
to at least provide more guidance specifically aimed at senior managers, with the 
Victorian government undertaking to provide clear guidance material to senior 
officers on the new provisions in the OHS Act 2004 (Vic).94  
93 HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, HEALTH AND SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMPANY DIRECTORS 
CONTRACT RESEARCH REPORT (2003), at <www.hse.gov.uk/pubs>. The research was based on surveys 
of more than 400 companies and public sector organizations with more than 250 employees. 
94 THE HON ROB HULLS MP, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY BILL 2004 SECOND READING 
SPEECH,  HANSARD, PARLIAMENT OF VICTORIA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 1764 (18 NOVEMBER 2004). 
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VII CONCLUSIONS 
Given the importance to the community and individuals of healthy and safe work-
places, good regulatory systems and effective legal and other mechanisms that 
promote effective OHS management are paramount. Negligence law and OHS 
regulation place the principal legal obligation to provide and maintain a healthy and 
safe workplace on the employer. This is a rational approach that is justified by the 
control of the employer over the business enterprise and how it is conducted.  
 
Although the employer is the principal dutyholder, there are very good arguments 
for the imposition of more specific legal responsibilities on directors and senior 
managers of companies. The common law of negligence and the fiduciary obliga-
tions of directors and senior employees provide little if any scope for individual 
legal liability, although the current inquiry by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services into corporate responsibility will enliven the 
debate about whether directors’ duties ought to be expanded to encompass other 
stakeholders, such as employees. The general criminal law provides very little cope 
for accountability, especially where a death or serious injury occurs as a result of an 
omission rather than a positive act. Industrial manslaughter provisions, with their 
heavier penalties and the possibility of imprisonment, provide an alternative and 
potentially effective source of individual liability, although the offences are very 
strictly confined and likely to be prosecuted exceedingly rarely.  
 
We must continue to rely on OHS legislation as the main source of individual 
liability. Whilst we must acknowledge that the issue of the deterrent effect of crimi-
nal provisions on individuals within corporations is a complex issue, there is evi-
dence that the risk of individual prosecution and punishment have a deterrent effect 
on some corporate managers, and this ultimately will benefit workers. Importantly, 
the symbolic, denunciatory value of individual liability provisions should not be 
undervalued. Accordingly, there is an important place for individual liability in 
OHS regulation. 
 
Given that OHS is a state responsibility, it is unsurprising that individual liability 
takes several different legislative forms. Of the current formulations, the most 
effective is the one that deems officers and managers to have committed an offence 
when the corporation has done so, subject to defences including due diligence. This 
provides a readily understandable, effective and appropriate standard of individual 
liability, especially as the concept of due diligence enables objective measures of 
conduct to be used.95 Ultimately, a statutory standard that provides detailed guid-
ance on how directors and managers can ensure a proactive, systems-based ap-
proach to OHS management in organisations is the best formulation. 
 
95 The due diligence model was endorsed by the Industry Commission, 1995. 
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Prosecution of individual officers who breach their due diligence obligations, or 
who demonstrate recklessness or gross negligence in safety matters, needs greater 
emphasis in the compliance regime, especially where a worker is killed or seriously 
injured. It is acknowledged that such a statement does not sit well with the ‘per-
suade, not punish’ approach that is likely to continue dominate OHS compliance 
strategies. Serious questions do need to be asked, however, about whether current 
enforcement policies, including the number of prosecutions and the types of duty 
holders prosecuted, are optimum.96 It appears that in enforcement the target is the 
organisation itself rather than the individuals that run them; those directors and 
managers that are prosecuted are likely to work for smaller companies. This may be 
justified if smaller companies have poorer OHS compliance overall, but whether 
smaller companies do is not certain. These decisions may be affected by practical 
matters like the relative difficulty in amassing evidence against an individual in an 
organisation compared to the organisation itself, and the relative ease in amassing 
evidence against a working director in a small company compared to a director or 
senior manager in a larger company that has a more complex organisational struc-
ture and more delegation of OHS responsibilities through several levels of man-
agement. Magistrates and judges may also be more willing to brand a corporation a 
criminal than to brand individuals criminals for regulatory breaches and, when they 
do, to generally lightly penalise even very culpable individuals.  
 
If we acknowledge the practical reality that non-legal strategies continue to domi-
nate in OHS compliance programs, we can perhaps learn something valuable from 
the British experience that voluntary guidance to companies on the importance of 
boards and senior management commitment to proactive OHS management pro-
grams can achieve positive results. The Australian OHS agencies could perform a 
very useful role in promoting voluntary board commitment to OHS and compliance 
with statutory duties, learning from the strategies of the Health and Safety Execu-
tive in Britain.  
 
It is hoped that, ultimately, a combination of stronger individual liability provisions, 
better legal enforcement and voluntary compliance will lead to fewer deaths and 




96 GUNNINGHAM & JOHNSTONE, supra n 45, ch 6. 
